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This thesis examines U.S. nonproliferation policy and the problem of nuclear
proliferation in India and Pakistan. Its central hypothesis is that the end of the Cold War
has created an opportunity to advance US. nonproliferation interests and work with both
India and Pakistan to reduce the threat of a nuclear confrontation on the Indian
Subcontinent. The thesis assesses both the motives for and the current status of the nuclear
weapons programs in India and Pakistan. It also presents some plausible scenarios
concerning future courses those programs could take. Finally, it presents a set of policy
recommendations directed toward reducing Indo-Pakistani nuclear tensions and laying the
foundation to make a future South Asian nuclear nonproliferation regime possible.
Ultimately, this approach would create safer, more stable security arrangements for India




I. U.S INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA 1
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 1
B. CURRENT INTERESTS 4
1. Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation . 5





1. Arms Control and Nonproliferation 12
2 Complementary Priorities 13
II. INDO- PAKISTANI NUCLEAR AMBITIONS . . . 15
A. CURRENT SITUATION 15




B. MOTIVATION 2 5
1. Analytical Approaches 25
2. Dominant Motive 27
C. FUTURE SOUTH ASIAN SCENARIOS 3
1. Status Quo 31
2. Go Nuclear 33
uuuLtzr KNOX LIBRARY
3. Surrender the Nuclear Option 34
D. CONCLUSION 3 6
III. U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY TOWARD INDIA AND
PAKISTAN 37
A. INTRODUCTION 37
B. U.S. POLICY OVERVIEW 38
1. Containment 3 9
2. Nonproliferation 42




IV. U.S. POLICY - NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND NEW OPTIONS . 52





5. Tension Reduction 58
6. Signal Intentions 60
a. Send a Signal 61
b. Lead by Example 62
B. CONCLUSION 63
V. CONCLUSION 64
A. KEY ACTORS 64
B. PROVIDE LEADERSHIP 65
C. GLOBAL BENEFITS 65
D. NEW APPROACHES 66
LIST OF REFERENCES 68
BIBLIOGRAPHY 84
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 92
I. U.S INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA
American domestic political and economic difficulties as
well as the end of the Cold War have spawned demands for a
"Peace Dividend" and a shift in emphasis from foreign policy
issues to greater attention to problems at home. However, it
seems highly unlikely that the United States would become
totally disengaged from foreign policy. In fact,
instantaneous communications, rapid world travel, an
increasingly interdependent world economy, and new immigration
patterns will facilitate and even demand that the U.S.
maintain an active foreign policy effort.
The challenge comes in identifying the important national
interests, and developing a foreign policy strategy that
represents those interests in relations with other nations and
regions of the world. This chapter establishes the
significant U.S. interests in the context of relations with
South Asia, particularly India and Pakistan. The discussion
of interests and priorities lays the foundation and
establishes the framework for the development of a revised
U.S. -South Asian policy.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
For over 40 years U.S. government officials under nine
different presidential administrations have struggled to
determine how much consideration South Asia should be given in
American policy-making decisions. In 1989 Paul Kreisberg
assessed the situation, "The essential problem throughout this
period has been that the region was never, in itself, of
serious concern to American policy-makers other than in the
context of East-West relations." 1 Considered by itself, South
Asia lies largely out of the view of American citizens and
their leaders.
However, the South Asian region lies at a strategic
crossroads. 2 The Indian Subcontinent has common borders on the
north with China and the former Soviet Union and in the west
with Iran and the Middle East. It also extends to the south
to sit astride the vital sea lanes through the Indian Ocean.
As a result, presidents from Harry Truman to George Bush have
struggled to come to terms with South Asian issues and place
them in the proper context with U.S. interests.
"The central dilemma of U.S. policy in South Asia since
1947 has been to deal with the competing claims of the two
central states of this region, India and Pakistan." 3 On one
hand, India is the home of one-fifth of the world's population
(approximately 860 million people) and the largest democratic
country in the world. 4 Its natural resources, growing middle
class and sound industrial and technological base make it a
potentially appealing ally. But its strong desire to avoid
"entangling alliances", and maintain its ability to act




U.S. relations with India have been constrained by the
effects of divergent strategic interests and fundamentally
different perceptions of communism. "Given differing Indian
and American strategic perceptions, it was inevitable that
India would turn elsewhere." 6
Pakistan, on the other hand, demonstrated early on that it
was willing and eager to become a member of the U.S. -led anti-
communist coalition in exchange for military and economic
assistance.
Pakistani leaders from Jinnah to Zia have sought
help from the USA, which has 'used' Pakistan for purposes
related to its own global objectives and concerns. In
consequence Pakistan has joined numerous American
sponsored defence pacts and agreements and become the
recipient of large doses of economic and military aid. 7
This combination of Pakistani availability and Indian
intransigence established the conditions under which U.S.
containment strategy operated in the South Asian Environment
during the Cold War.
The Cold War has ended and altered the significance of the
South Asian crossroad in American interests. It is essential
that the U.S. reassess its interests in the region and shape
its foreign policy to support those interests. Some scholars
such as Samuel P. Huntington have already suggested that
American involvement in many Third World situations will
disappear. Without the Cold War it is hard to see how
much interest the United States will have in . . . whether
India or Pakistan controls Kashmir. South Asia is simply
not an American strategic priority. 8
This view assumes that the United States' only interests
in the Third World and South Asia are (or were) related to the
Cold War. This is simply not true. It is true that
"containment strategy and interlinking security alliances ...
guided American thinking toward South Asia." 9 However, other
interests have always existed and periodically gathered enough
momentum to command attention.
B. CURRENT INTERESTS
The Bush Administration has identified 21 national
security interests and objectives for the 1990s. 10 Included
in this list are three that have a special significance with
regard to South Asia.
1. Improve stability by pursuing equitable and verifiable
nuclear arms control agreements.
2. Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those
powers that might seek regional dominance.
3. Promote diplomatic solutions to regional disputes.
These interests are directly applicable in the South Asian
context. India and Pakistan have the only advanced nuclear
programs in the region. They possess the two most powerful
armed forces and are the primary regional rivals. The
National Security Strategy of the United States addresses only
one paragraph to specific U.S. concerns in South Asia.
However, the concerns are compelling:
In South Asia, as elsewhere, we strongly believe that
security is best served by resolving disputes through
negotiations rather than military pressure. The dangers
of intermediate-range missile deployments and nuclear
proliferation in the sub-continent persist, however, and
this year we were unable to certify Pakistan's nuclear
program under the Pressler Amendment. We will continue to
encourage Indo-Pakistani rapprochement and the adoption of
confidence-building measures and other concrete steps to
moderate their military competition. 11
The number of direct U.S. interests in South Asia may be
minimal when compared to Europe or the Middle East. However,
they are of such importance that the can be ignored only at
great peril. 12
1. Nuclear Arms Control and Nonproliferation
First of all, for the sake of clarity, definitions of
the terms nonproliferation and arms control should be
established. There are two types of nuclear nonprolif eration
.
The first, horizontal nonprolif eration, refers to efforts to
prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons and technology by
countries which have not previously possessed them.
Examples of horizontal nonprolif eration efforts are:
The provisions of Articles I, II, and III of the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 13 which prohibit
the transfer to or manufacture of nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosive devices by the Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) and
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. 14
The second type, vertical nonprolif eration, directly
affects nuclear weapons states (NWS) . It limits the increase
in quantity, quality or sophistication of nuclear weapons
arsenals and technology by states which already possess them.
Examples of this type include The Strategic Arms Limitations
Treaties (SALT) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) negotiated between the United States and Soviet Union
and Article VI of the NPT. :5
Arms control is directed toward vertical
nonproliferation. Arms control is the reduction, control or
limitation of existing nuclear weapons capabilities.
Throughout the remainder of this paper nonproliferation will
refer to specifically to horizontal nonproliferation and arms
control will be associated with vertical nonproliferation
.
It is irrelevant to consider the South Asian nuclear
issue solely in terms of either arms control or
nonproliferation measures because both India and Pakistan have
advanced their nuclear weapons programs to such a point that
they are now weapons-capable states. Both countries are
categorized as "de facto nuclear states", even though they
both maintain officially that they do not possess or intend to
build nuclear weapons. 16
In this context it is appropriate to try to prevent
further escalation and expansion of these capabilities through
arms control measures. However, it is also important to
realize that neither state has declared itself to be an NWS.
India tested a nuclear explosive device in 1974.
However, since that time, it has not conducted any further
tests. 17 Pakistan has never conducted an actual test of an
explosive device. But on February 7, 1992 it publicly issued
its "first formal acknowledgement that it has the capacity to
make an atomic bomb." 18 Both countries continue to maintain
that in spite of their capabilities they have refrained from
actually constructing nuclear weapons.
Even though India and Pakistan have expressed
reservations concerning nonproliferation regimes, this
situation presents a possibility that some nonproliferation
measures could be effective.
The combination of existing nuclear capabilities,
regional animosity and ambiguity presents a complicated
situation. The South Asian nuclear issue does not fall
exclusively within the ambit of either nonprolif eration or
arms control scenarios. Flexibility, compromise and creative
thinking which combine aspects of both approaches may lead to
solutions which can satisfy U.S. interests.
2. Stable Military Balance
The U.S. must consider the military balance in South
Asia because of its relationship to the nuclear weapons issue.
Both India and Pakistan see their nuclear weapons programs as
the force multiplier and equalizing factor in the regional
strategic military balance.
The decision to advance India's nuclear weapons
program was made in the aftermath of its humiliating defeat by
China in 1962 and China's detonation of a nuclear device in
1964. 19 Former Chief of the Indian Army Staff, General
K.Sundarji has written,
China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964. India,
which already had a peaceful nuclear programme underway,
decided to master the technology of nuclear explosions. 20
India has continued to emphasize the Chinese threat as
its primary concern. Government officials justify India's
refusal to sign the NPT and reluctance to engage in South
Asian nuclear arms talks by pointing out that these efforts do
not take into consideration the Chinese threat. 21
India's accelerated efforts triggered a response in
kind from Pakistan. From 1971 to 1974 India and Pakistan had
maintained an uneasy peace along their border. Three wars in
1948, 1965, and 1971 had ended in military defeats for
Pakistan, but with mixed political results. 22 However, upon
learning that India had conducted a nuclear test, Pakistan's
prime minister, Z.A. Bhutto reportedly said "that Pakistan
would develop a weapon of its own even if Pakistanis had to
'eat grass' to meet the cost." 23 In his memoirs Bhutto also
wrote,
The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this
capability [nuclear weapons] . The communist powers also
possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it,
but that was about to change. 24
Pakistan cannot afford to compete with India in a
conventional arms race. Pakistan already spends an estimated
6.9 percent of its GNP to maintain its armed forces at 484
thousand, while India's 1.3 million man armed forces consume
only 3.5 percent GNP. 25 It sees nuclear weapons development
as a cost effective way to deter India and maintain a balance
of power in the region. Pakistan's Minister for Defense
Production stated recently that, "Our aim is to create and
develop a military capability which is visible and correctly
perceived by our enemies so that they dare not consider
aggression against us.""
Thomas W. Graham points out that it is extremely
expensive to develop and deploy a nuclear arsenal as part of
a country's strategic forces. 27 However, it may not be
necessary to actually deploy weapons to achieve a deterrent
effect. This has been the rationale behind Pakistan's
ambiguous "bomb in the basement" strategy. 28
The nuclear issue is , therefore, inextricably linked
to the issue of the strategic military balance in South Asia.
U.S. policy makers must consider efforts to help stabilize the
military balance as a vital element of any nuclear arms
control policy in the region.
3 . Regional Diplomacy
In spite of the relative peace which has existed
between India and Pakistan for the last 20 years, tensions
remain high. The Kashmir issue remains unsolved. 29 Ethnic
violence and tensions in Pakistan's Sind Province and the
Indian Punjab are exacerbated by charges of cross-border
support for insurgents. 30
There is growing concern in the United States and
throughout the world that any one of these ongoing disputes
could erupt into a full-scale war and escalate quickly to
include the use of nuclear weapons. In June 1990 and again in
November 1991 the Bush Administration dispatched high-level
officials to India and Pakistan to dissuade both sides from
going to war over Kashmir. Both trips were prompted by U.S.
fears that nuclear weapons might be used. 31
The U.S. interest in peaceful conflict resolution is
more than just an altruistic goal. Diplomacy as a replacement
for armed conflict represents a stabilizing solution rather
than one which has a potential to destabilize both regional
and domestic balances of power. A number of high-ranking
Indian and Pakistani military officials have expressed the
opinion that had it not been for vigorous U.S. intervention
efforts in 1990, there would almost certainly have been a
war. 32
Another war between India and Pakistan would give the
military in both countries an even greater level of influence.
This is especially dangerous in Pakistan, which has a
historical experience with military coups to replace civilian-
led constitutional governments. 33
10
In India, the Army has become a more reluctant
participant in operations against Indian citizens. 34 In
February 1992, "a group of retired army officers suggested
that the post of a Chief of Defence Staff be created to
thoroughly weigh the consequences of the involvement of our
armed forces." 35 The group cited limiting Army involvement
in internal conflicts, avoidance of war with Pakistan,
resolution of the Punjab dispute, and support for government
economic reforms as their agenda. 36 This attempt to gain
greater influence in the decision-making process may indicate
a growing disillusionment among defence officials.
Another war on the subcontinent could further weaken
support for the civilian governments and jeopardize the
democratic systems currently in place. The financial burden
of war on weak economic systems coupled with increased ethnic
violence could strain the crisis management abilities of the
coalition governments currently in power. Military
organizations might be persuaded to step in to attempt to
restore order. The interests of the United States would
suffer if the region becomes less democratic and more
unstable. American efforts to promote diplomatic solutions
will support the stability of democratic regimes.
C. PRIORITIES
In the past U.S. policy makers had to balance the relative
importance of all other interests in South Asia against the
11
Cold War containment priority. Beginning with the Carter
Administration in 1977, the nuclear issue achieved a greater
prominence, but still remained subordinate to the containment
imperative. Now that the Cold War has ended the priorities
have been reassessed.
1. Arms Control and Nonproliferation
By most standards of evaluation the nuclear issue is
now the primary U.S. concern in South Asia. In global,
regional and bilateral terms nuclear arms control and nuclear
nonproliferation have become the most important U.S. security
interests
.
In South Asia, achievement of a complete
nonproliferation regime may no longer be a viable U.S. policy
option. Based on what is known about the nuclear programs in
India and Pakistan, it is clear that nuclear weapons, to some
extent, have proliferated. Now that Pakistan has declared its
nuclear weapons capability, it appears to have rendered
presidential certification under the Pressler Amendment
impossible. 37
Given India's long-standing commitment to its nuclear
program and Pakistan's recent announcement of its
capabilities, it is pointless to ignore the fact that the
nuclear weapons genie is out of the bottle in South Asia. The
logical U.S. course of action in the near term is to pursue a
policy of nuclear arms control aimed at freezing the Indian
12
and Pakistani programs at their current levels. In the long
term the U.S. should still hold nonproliferation as its
ultimate goal.
2. Complementary Priorities
Priority conflicts during the Cold War created a
dilemma for policy makers. Decisions made to act in favor of
one interest frequently interfered with the accomplishment of
another. The most obvious example is the decision to oppose
the Soviets in Afghanistan at the expense of nonproliferation
interests
.
However, the situation has now changed. The
interests discussed above are linked and complementary. They
do not conflict with or contradict one another. Progress
toward achievement of any one of the National Security
Strategy goals will contribute either directly or indirectly
to the others.
Improved diplomatic relations on a general level or
peaceful resolution of any particular regional issue could
provide a basis for other successes. For example, improved
U.S. -Indian relations could be stimulated by resolution of the
intellectual property rights issue. 38 This could, in turn,
facilitate expanded joint military exercises in the Indian
Ocean.
Closer cooperation between military establishments
might help to allay India's concerns about U.S. hegemonic
13
intentions in South Asia and encourage a slowdown of their
efforts to expand the military. This would also send a signal
about India's intentions to Pakistan which might be further
encouraged to limit its nuclear program or seek to expand its
existing agreement with India, which protects declared nuclear
facilities from attack. 39
Even though this is a hypothetical chain of events it
illustrates the point that U.S. interests in all three areas
are linked. Progress in one may pave the way for progress in
another.
The United States has significant post-Cold War
interests in South Asia. It would be a mistake to allow the
U.S. foreign policy toward the region to continue to operate
in a zero-sum, Cold War framework. It would be equally
inadvisable to allow it to slip into a state of benign neglect
because of increased U.S. domestic pressures now that the Cold
War is over and communism has lost.
The conflict between incompatible and competing
foreign policy interests has been eliminated. U.S. government
officials in the Administration and Congress should capitalize
on this opportunity and take steps to formulate a foreign




II. INDO-PAKISTANI NUCLEAR AMBITIONS
As the possessors of some of the Third World's most
advanced nuclear technology and the antagonists in an ongoing
rivalry, India and Pakistan pose a major threat of becoming
involved in a nuclear conflict. This chapter examines the
current status of the nuclear weapons programs in South Asia
and examines the motives that have spurred nuclear
development. It also presents an analysis of the potential
directions these two nations may take in the future.
A. CURRENT SITUATION
1. Calculated Ambiguity
In 1974 India exploded a nuclear device in the desert
of Rajasthan, thus demonstrating to the world that it was
capable of constructing nuclear weapons. Pakistan also
announced that it intended to be second to none in South
Asia. 40 Beyond this, both countries have been extremely
evasive about the details of their programs. Until very
recently it has been difficult to determine the exact
capability or the intentions of either country. Both
countries have declined to become parties to the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) or submit all their facilities
to IAEA inspections and safeguards.
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Most of the open source literature dealing with their
capabilities is based largely upon ambiguous statements by
government officials and assumptions drawn from circumstantial
evidence
.
This situation is referred to as calculated ambiguity
or nuclear ambiguity. 41 In spite of evidence that would
indicate otherwise, both India and Pakistan have, until
recently, continued to insist that their nuclear programs are
peaceful in nature. They have practiced this policy of
ambiguity in order to extract the most utility from the
benefits of their nuclear weapons programs. At the same time,
they have maintained the shield of ambiguity to minimize some
of the economic and political costs. 42
It is important, however to be aware of the nuclear
weapons capabilities that may exist.
2. Capabilities
a. India
The program in India is fairly well developed,
having begun in the late 1940s. Prime Minister Jawarhalal
Nehru was firmly committed to nonviolence and international
disarmament. He was enthusiastic about nuclear energy, but
opposed to nuclear weapons. As Minister for Atomic Energy, he
kept the nuclear program and the Atomic Energy Commission
under his close personal supervision. 43 However, after his
death in 1964, and in the aftermath of India's military defeat
16
by China, there was public debate about the possibility (and
desirability) of development of a bomb. 44
India's defeat by China in 1962 exposed the glaring
weaknesses of India's military and raised great doubts about
its ability to defend itself. However, even more important
than that was China's detonation of a nuclear device in 1964.
China's test at Lop Nor was the catalyst which propelled
Nehru's successor, Prime Minister Lai Badhur Shastri to
authorize an accelerated research program beginning in 1964
and preparations to conduct a test. 45
India has always maintained that its 1974 test was
a peaceful nuclear explosion [hereafter, PNE] . 46 This seems,
at first glance, to be a contradiction in terms. However, at
the time there was significant ongoing debate in many nations
concerning peaceful uses and benefits to be gained from
nuclear research and test explosions. The Atoms for Peace
program was initiated to provide assistance to nations who
wanted to develop nuclear programs for peaceful means. 47
Since that time the concept of PNEs has been discredited and
the Atoms for Peace program has been abandoned.
The Indians have proceeded slowly with their
program. In spite of fears that the PNE would lead to a rapid
build-up of nuclear weapons in South Asia, this has not yet
occurred. Political leaders have steadfastly maintained that
the government has chosen not to build any weapons and that
their program remains peaceful. They have also stated that
17
this is a unilateral decision and that should the situation
change, the Government of India alone has the authority to
determine the course of its nuclear program.
One of the most important factors which limits any
nation's ability to produce nuclear weapons is its access to
nuclear fuels and related products. India has put
considerable emphasis on the acquisition and production of
fissile materials. It has accumulated significant stockpiles
(both safeguarded under IAEA and unsafeguarded) of uranium and
plutonium. It has the capability to reprocess several hundred
kilograms of plutonium annually — more than enough to satisfy
its fuel requirements. 48
However, heavy water, an essential component of any
nuclear weapons program, poses a more serious problem. India
still relies largely on imports from Canada and Russia, under
IAEA safeguards. In his essay in Nuclear Proliferation in
South Asia, Akhtar Ali speculated that India may have been
able to import additional quantities of heavy water either
illegally from Norway, which has a large production
capability, or secretly from China, which is not an NPT
49
In February 1992, the Norwegian government
announced that it had discovered documentary evidence that
India had purchased two unauthorized shipments of Norwegian
heavy water through third parties. The first, in 1983, was
diverted through a German company. The second was provided by
Romania in 1986. 50
India also possesses sufficient delivery systems to
reach any part of South Asia with nuclear weapons. Its MiG-
23, Jaguar and Mirage-2000 aircraft have ranges extending up
to 920 miles. 51 This is more than adequate to strike any
conceivable target in Pakistan. Reports from New Delhi also
indicate that the Indian Air Force may be in line to purchase
U.S. F-16C and D model aircraft as replacements for its aging
MiG-21 fleet. 52 In addition, India recently tested its own
indigenously produced intermediate range ballistic missiles
(IRBM) ."
b. Pakistan
In comparison to India, Pakistan's nuclear program
is relatively new. Pakistan's program began in the mid-50s
with the establishment of the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC) and with the assistance of the Atoms for
Peace Program. 54 During this early period Pakistani
politicians and the military had very little interest in a
nuclear weapons program. In 1954, Pakistan's Foreign
Minister, Zafrullah Khan, captured the essence of Pakistan's
interest in nuclear weapons when he stated that "his country
did not have a policy on the atom bomb." 55
There was not even much concern with India's
nuclear activity and the potential military threat. 56 The
19
only exception to this was within the Pakistan scientific
community. Researchers in the PAEC were somewhat motivated by
the spirit of nationalistic rivalry with India and wanted to
demonstrate that they were capable of the same accomplishments
as their Indian counterparts. 57
Several events in the 1970s provided the impetus
for Pakistan's program. The first was Pakistan's defeat by
India in the 1971 war which resulted in the further partition
of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. Pakistanis
extracted three bitter lessons from that defeat. They
concluded that:
1. India was intent on either destroying Pakistan or forcing
it to rejoin India.
2. Pakistan could never match India's conventional military
3. Pakistan could not rely on its two closest allies, the
United States and China, to intervene militarily on its
behalf in any future conflict. 59
The second event was the election of Z.A. Bhutto in
the 1972 election which ended the martial law regime. As
Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1968-1970, and then as Prime
Minister, Bhutto was the most vocal advocate of a nuclear
Pakistan. He stated that the people of Pakistan would do




Using public anti-military sentiments, fear of the
Indian threat, and his own populist movement, Bhutto made
20
nuclear development a national issue. He was able to elevate
it to a much higher national priority than it had ever held in
the past
.
The next event was India's nuclear explosion in
1974. This was seen as a clear signal that India intended to
develop a bomb that could be used to destroy Pakistan or bully
her into submission. Tensions were still high in the
aftermath of the 1971 Indo-Pak war. Pakistani leaders were
still smarting from the bitter defeat and the loss of
Bangladesh (East Pakistan)
.
The final significant event was the selection of
Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan to head the PAEC . Dr. Khan is commonly
referred to as "The Father of the Islamic Bomb" . He served as
a scientist and researcher in a number of European nations
until he returned to Pakistan in 1974. He is widely suspected
of having "stolen" much of the technology that has made
Pakistan's weapons objective an achievable goal. "Dr. Khan
has been accused of having stolen the secrets of the
centrifuge uranium enrichment process during his association
with the URENCO's uranium enrichment plant at Almelo in
Holland." 61 In addition, he is also recognized as an expert
in the field of high strength metals and alloys which are also
essential to nuclear weapons production. 62
A.Q. Khan provided the expertise and leadership which
enabled Pakistan's program to be transformed from the
21
implausible dream of a underdeveloped nation to that of a
realistic, obtainable reality.
Throughout the 80s and early 90s Pakistan practiced
a policy of deterrence through ambiguity. It has also been
Pakistan's policy to proclaim that, like India's, its program
was peaceful, not oriented toward weapons development. On the
other hand, government officials often promoted claims that
the capability existed if needed. In a 1987 Time magazine
interview President Zia ul-Haq stated that, "You can write
today that Pakistan can build a bomb whenever it wishes." 63
However, he also stated that "Pakistan is not indulging in a
nuclear experiment for military purposes." 64
In August and September 1991 former Prime Minister,
Benazir Bhutto made a number of public statements critical of
Pakistan's nuclear program. She also stated that "Pakistan
has the information and the capability to build a nuclear
bomb." 6S A number of government officials voiced concern
that Mrs. Bhutto's comments constituted a breach of security
based on her access to classified information and some
officials called for criminal charges to be filed. 66
Admittedly, some of this concern may have been
politically motivated in order to discredit her. However, her
statements indicate two important points. First, that the
official government policy is still to practice designed
ambiguity. Second, that there may be a significant faction
among the political elite that is prepared to challenge that
22
policy. The possible options for this group would be to move
toward nonproliferation or openly declare Pakistan to be a
nuclear weapons state.
On February 7, 1992 the Pakistani Government
officially acknowledged that it does possess "the capacity for
making an atomic bomb." b7 In a surprise announcement having
"essentially the same significance as India's detonation of a
nuclear explosive device in 1974.
"
68 This puts Pakistan one
step closer to becoming a declared nuclear weapon state. It
also changes the nature of Pakistan's nuclear ambiguity.
There is no longer any question about the nature of Pakistan's
nuclear program. The only ambiguity that remains is "How far
has Pakistan's weapons program progressed?"
Pakistan's bomb is probably the enriched uranium
type, since they have had this technology operational since
1984. However, Pakistan has also experimented with plutonium
reprocessing. How successful this experiment has been is
still open to question. Two reprocessing facilities have been
built, with a third under construction. Operating at peak
capability, Leonard Spector estimates that these facilities
may be able to produce up to 200 kilograms of plutonium per
year. However, it is doubtful that they have been able to
achieve full production. 69
Delivery systems capability is of great concern to
Pakistan. It currently possesses 39 U. S . -manufactured F-16s
and was scheduled to purchase 60 more before aid was suspended
23
by the U.S. government in October 1990. 70 Its fleet of 58
Mirage-Vs is also capable of carrying a nuclear payload. 71
However, their range of 450 miles puts a great many of the
desired Indian targets well outside Pakistan's strike
capability. 72
Pakistan has initiated a missile test program,
possibly with the technical assistance of China. 73 In June
1991 a number of reports surfaced that China had agreed to
sell M-ll missiles to Pakistan. 74 If this is true, it would
give Pakistan a tested, reliable delivery system. Pakistan's
emphasis on self-sufficiency in defense production may
motivate it to attempt to reverse engineer this missile
system. 75 This could lead to ability to produce an indigenous
delivery system without having to conduct extensive (and
expensive) research and development testing.
Unlike India, most of Pakistan's nuclear
development is limited by its access to foreign suppliers.
The London Suppliers Agreement of 1976 places strict controls
and limits on the transfer and sale of nuclear technology and
related products. Pakistan has access to safeguarded
resources under this agreement but technology which has a dual
use or strictly military use is not available from these
sources, except under IAEA safeguards.
Again, China is not bound by this agreement and is
Pakistan's most likely source for items not available
elsewhere. If China fulfills its promise to sign the NPT and
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adhere to the constraints of the Missile Technology Control
Regime, the adverse affects on Pakistan's program could be
significant. However, there is some concern that China's
defense industries may be able to operate autonomously in
spite of decisions made by other government agencies. 7b
At the present time Pakistan's weak industrial base
and limited capability for expansion are its greatest limiting
factors. However, Pakistan has proven to be remarkably adept
at overcoming its infrastructural shortcomings and making its
purchases in the international gray market. 77 As long as
their program is not self-sufficient they will have to work
within the constraints imposed by their outside sources.
B . MOTIVATION
The key to deciphering the Indo-Pakistani nuclear
situation is understanding the factors that motivate the two
countries' desire to acquire nuclear weapons technology.
Nuclear proliferation is a process, not an event. The most
important factor in understanding the nuclear weapons
situation is an awareness of the events, situations and
conditions which motivate India and Pakistan to participate in
the nuclearization process.
1. Analytical Approaches
Much of the current literature dealing with nuclear
weapons proliferation in South Asia attempts to categorize the
motivations for India and Pakistan (and Third World countries,
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in general) in one of two ways. The first method is based on
defining motivating factors in terms of either political or
military/security issues. 78 Those who use this approach to
explain weapons proliferation generally argue that
"Nonproliferation specialists have not fully comprehended the
dynamics of regional proliferation and the perceived value of
nuclear weapons in world politics." 79 They argue that
political factors are the most important and influential in
the nuclear decision-making process. Even discussions of
military and security aspects of nuclear weapons include
consideration of political factors. 80
One problem with this method for establishing
categories is that it does not consider the linkage between
political and military factors. Chellaney states that "the
importance of nuclear weapons in the world today, however, is
tied intrinsically to their political value." 81 The security
value of nuclear weapons is considered to be politically
significant but not useful in a military context.
The second approach to defining and categorizing South
Asian motives is geographically oriented. Proponents of this
method tend to group Indian and Pakistani motives into classes
such as global, regional and domestic/local in nature. 82
This approach seems to be a modern-day derivative of
the Kautilian "Mandala Theory". 83 These classes of motives
start with the state at the center and expand to include
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increasingly larger geographical areas, until finally reaching
global international proportions.
Within each of these categories falls a number of
motives. The motives at each level can be further
characterized as either political or military in nature. In
other words, no geographic category consists of purely
political or purely military motives.
These two approaches suffer from the same shortcoming.
They tend to be static in nature and describe the situation
only at a particular point in time. This helps identify some
of the motives which may be temporarily influential. However,
they are of limited use in trying to identify the long-term
motive which has dominated nuclear decision-making in South
Asia.
2. Dominant Motive
In both India and Pakistan the nuclear weapons
programs have been continued despite changes in political
leadership that resulted in otherwise fundamentally different
governments. Pakistan has gone from the democratic socialist
Zulfiqar Bhutto regime in the mid-1970s, to the Islam-based
military dictatorship of Muhammed Zia ul-Haq. 84 It has since
seen two more moderate democratic changes of government led by
Benazir Bhutto on one hand, and Nawaz Sharif on the other.
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Yet despite the radically different political
philosophies of these leaders, the nuclear weapons program has
been continued by each successive government.
In India, internal changes have produced a relative
decline in the dominance of the Congress Party, a period of
constitutional emergency under Indira Gandhi, and two short-
lived minority governments. Like its neighbor, India has
continued to maintain its nuclear policy in spite of these
otherwise significant political changes.
The best explanation for this phenomena is found in
the analysis of their motives for nuclear weapons. While many
of the political motives have changed over time, the issue of
survival of the nation and defense of borders has remained
unchanged. Security from military threats has been, and
remains, the primary reason to acquire nuclear weaponry. 85
As stated earlier in this chapter, the events which
compelled India to launch its nuclear weapons program were the
1962 Sino-Indian War and China's nuclear test in 1964. As
P.R. Chari states, "The Chinese invasion across the Himalayas
in 1962, and China's first nuclear explosion in 1964 seminally
influenced India's nuclear policies." 86 The Sino-Indian
situation has not changed measurably since then. In December
1991, Li Peng became the first Chinese head of state to visit
India in over 30 years. While this was given great attention
as a breakthrough in Sino-Indian relations, the long-standing
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tensions over border issues and weapons transfers remain
unsolved. 87
China is still considered to be India's main source of
concern from a military and strategic perspective. India's
primary argument against a South Asian nuclear agreement of
any kind continues to be that a regional settlement would not
address its security situation with respect to China. 88
As long as India's position on nuclear weapons remains
unchanged, Pakistan's motives for nuclear weapons will remain
in place. While announcing publicly its nuclear capability,
Pakistan's foreign minister also stated that it would be
"impossible for Pakistan to dismantle its program without a
similar move by India. " 8y Over the period of the last 25
years, the most constant factor in Pakistan's nuclear weapons
equation has been the desire to acquire a deterrent to India's
conventional and nuclear superiority.
Ashok Kapur has argued convincingly that under Z.A.
Bhutto, the primary motivation for Pakistan's nuclear program
was to "match Indian nuclear capability; and/or deter India's
military superiority after 1971 by nuclear means." 90 In
spite of changing regional and global political circumstances
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, this factor did not change.
Changes in the U. S . -Pakistani relationship (including
U.S. nonproliferation sanctions), the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the end of the Cold War have had little or no
effect on changing Pakistan's desire to develop nuclear
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weapons capabilities. Kapur also has concluded that,
[Under Zia] changed circumstances increased the incentive
to remain on the nuclear path. (The reasoning was/is that
the nuclear project is a symbol of nationhood, sovereignty
and indeed national survival). 91
In fact, a number of U.S. government officials have
voiced the opinion that aid to Pakistan in the 1980s allowed
President Zia the opportunity to advance his nuclear
The issue of national survival remains for Pakistan,
virtually the same today as it has been since 1947. India
remains its closest neighbor, the most powerful nation in the
region, and its greatest rival. The fear of extermination by
India, which compelled Bhutto to undertake the nuclear weapons
program in 1976, is the only factor which has consistently
been strong enough to keep successive governments in Pakistan
committed to the development of nuclear weapons. 93
C. FUTURE SOUTH ASIAN SCENARIOS
India and Pakistan have reached a decisive point on the
nuclear weapons path. There appears to be three possible
routes which can be taken. The choices are:
• Maintain the ambiguous nuclear option (Status Quo)
.
• Declare possession of a nuclear arsenal (Go Nuclear)
.
• Dismantle nuclear program (Surrender the Option)
.




India and Pakistan could both choose to maintain the
position that they are nuclear capable, but not nuclear armed.
In spite of Pakistan's recent admissions that its nuclear
program has achieved a weapons capability, it can sustain its
status of nuclear ambiguity. Pakistan's announcement that it
has the capability, but has chosen not to exercise the option,
has put its weapons program in the same status as India's.
A number of scholars have argued that, like the
superpower rivalry, nuclear weapons proliferation in South
Asia has introduced an element of stability to the Indo-
Pakistani rivalry and prevented the occurrence of a major war
since 1971. 94 This possible deterrent effect is appealing to
both countries because it is achieved without actually having
to assemble or deploy nuclear weapons. 95
The current ambiguous position also offers a great
deal of flexibility to Indian and Pakistani leaders. As long
as the nuclear option can be maintained without actually
crossing the threshold into the realm of the NWS it is also
possible to back away from the threshold should future
circumstances warrant.
On the other hand, the current policy of ambiguity
carries with it some dangerous risks. It provides a cover
under which the two nations' nuclear bureaucracies can
continue to operate, free from scrutiny. This could lead to
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an arms race to that both programs could grow more advanced
and sophisticated and remain just shy of actual deployment.
The decision to continue an ambiguous nuclear program
also carries with it a financial burden. Nuclear weapons
programs demand allocation of resources that will limit
implementation of other important economic policies. The
economic disincentive alone is not likely to dissuade either
India or Pakistan from pursuing their nuclear weapons
programs, but it will influence the decision-making
9b
Additionally, continued pursuit of this option offers
very little hope that the situation between India and Pakistan
will improve. Indo-Pakistani relations in this type of
situation would continue to be controlled by the mutual fear
and mistrust which one Pakistani journalist has labeled "The
structure of collective paranoia." 97
Indo-Pakistani relations under this option, would
continue in a extended state of brinkmanship. In this type of
stressful environment, many fear that the line between
ambiguity and deployment could be easily crossed. 98
This policy would also limit the ability of either
country to develop improved relations with the United States,
given current U.S. nonproliferation policy. This is, of
course, only a drawback if one assumes that India and Pakistan
desire improved relations with the U.S. 99
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At the recently concluded Indo-US Strategic Symposium
in Washington, D.C., the mood was decidedly optimistic. Many
of the papers presented reflected a very positive outlook on
the prospects for increased Indo-US cooperation. 100
Continuation of the status quo policy is the most
likely near-term strategy to be followed in both India and
Pakistan. 101 It is the automatic solution if no decision is
made to initiate change. It also offers the benefit of
avoiding political risk. Given the current domestic situation
and relatively weak ruling parties, it is unlikely that Indian
or Pakistani leaders will be anxious to take big risks on an
emotional issue.
2. Go Nuclear
This option would undoubtedly fuel a nuclear arms race
on the Indian Subcontinent that neither country wants or can
afford. Since both sides currently rely on the deterrent
effects of their ambiguous parity, a decision to go nuclear by
one would compel the other to do likewise. The economic and
political expenses of a South Asian nuclear arms race are
In spite of this significant drawback, there are
growing numbers of influential people on both sides of the
border who favor this option. Retired Chief of The Pakistan
Army Staff, General Aslam Beg, has formed a non-governmental
think-tank called "The Foundation for Research on National
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Defence and Security", or "FRIENDS". 103 The majority of its
members are conservatives, academic hard-liners and retired
military officers, most of whom have publicly stated their
preference for a declared nuclear policy. 104 If one of the
goals of FRIENDS is the advancement of the Pakistani pro-
nuclear position, it could well have a great deal of influence
on the government's political leaders.
One of the leading Indian proponents of a declared
nuclear policy is retired General Sundarji, former chief of
the army staff. In his "Brasstacks" column in India Today, he
has defended the position that it is too late for a South
Asian nonproliferation regime because proliferation has
already occurred. He also states his position that India
should assume its rightful place along side the other NWS and
"indicate our willingness to go along with the rest of the
nuclear haves in preventing uncontrolled proliferation." 105
It is difficult to predict whether India or Pakistan
will choose this option. However, the threat of an overt
nuclear arms race in South Asia is too serious to be ignored.
3. Surrender the Nuclear Option
There are a number of variants to this option.
However, all of them would produce the same effect. The
threat of nuclear weapons would be virtually removed from the
Indian Subcontinent.
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Some of the possible ways to achieve this are through
unilateral accession to the NPT by India and/or Pakistan,
establishment of a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in South
Asia, or through the negotiation of a series of lesser CBMs
that results in an incremental step-by-step approach.
Unfortunately, even though this may be the most
desirable for U.S. interests, in the eyes of the international
community, and provide the greatest long-term benefits to
India and Pakistan, this is also the most difficult, as well
as the least likely option to be achieved. The benefits of
this option are self-evident, but the risks and difficulties
are many
.
India's objections to this option are the greatest.
A regional solution that does not include consideration of the
Sino-Indian problem has been categorically rejected because of
the Chinese nuclear threat to India. 106 India is also
philosophically opposed to the NPT on the grounds that it
unfairly discriminates against the NNWS. 107
Many in Pakistan also have objections to NPT-style
agreements. 108 However, the official government policy
continues to support agreements that would be uniformly
binding on both countries. 109
Despite the difficulties associated with this option,
the potential benefits to South Asia and the world make it an
option worthy of serious consideration. If this approach were
to be taken in a series of incremental steps over an extended
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time period it might be successful. Benefits would accrue to
India and Pakistan in the form of enhanced security at a much
lower cost as well as greater acceptance by and integration
into the international community.
D. CONCLUSION
The proliferation of nuclear weapons ranks high on the
agenda of international issues. As long as India and Pakistan
retain both their adversarial relationship and their nuclear
weapons programs a good deal of attention and pressure will
continue to be focussed there.
There is little expectation that a dramatic change will
take place overnight, or even in the near future. However,
both sides have shown a great deal of restraint by avoiding an
all-out nuclear arms race up to this point. And recent
developments indicate that there is some room for tentative
negotiations
.
The road to agreement between India and Pakistan on
nuclear issues is a long and difficult one. But it is also a
road worth exploring. As long as both sides proceed
cautiously, the prospects for incremental improvements exist.
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III. U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY TOWARD INDIA AND PAKISTAN
A. INTRODUCTION
Nuclear weapons have generated global concerns in two
respects. First, nuclear fears focused on mutual deterrence
and the avoidance of nuclear war were at the center of the
superpower conflict. Second, the global spread of nuclear
weapons capabilities has caused a conflict between the nuclear
weapons states and those which aspire to acquire them. The
end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union
has rendered the first issue much less salient and
dramatically altered the second.
The U.S. victory in the Cold War has as a by-product
reduced the threat of a superpower nuclear conflict. In addi-
tion, the United States and the Russian Republic, heir to the
majority of the Soviet Union's arsenal of nuclear weapons,
have recently engaged in a series of offers to reduce
unilaterally and reciprocally their arsenals. 110 Thus,
reducing the risk even further.
Unfortunately, the end of the Cold War has contributed
little to resolution of the issue of the proliferation of
nuclear weapons to other states and in some cases intensified
it. Weapons formerly controlled by the Soviet Union are now
held by four separate republics. The political stability of
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these republics and security of their nuclear weapons is one
concern. Another is that sensitive nuclear technology may be
sold in international markets as a source of hard curren-
cy. 111 There is also concern about the potential for a
"brain drain" in which a Third World nation aspiring to
acquire nuclear weapons could buy the expertise of scientists
and technicians who formerly served in the USSR. 112 This
change has provided the U.S. with the motivation and the
opportunity to approach the issue of nonproliferation in other
regions with new vigor.
This chapter examines the U.S. approach to nuclear prolif-
eration in South Asia. The intensity of the historical
confrontation between India and Pakistan, two nuclear thresh-
old states, makes this one of the most volatile regions of the
world. This chapter presents a brief overview of U.S. policy
in South Asia, highlighting the key elements of its nuclear
nonproliferation approach and an analysis of the effects of
this policy on U.S. relations with India and Pakistan.
B. U.S. POLICY OVERVIEW
As in other regions of the world, U.S. policy in South
Asia has been dominated by two concerns. Since the end of
World War II containment of communism has most influenced U.S.
foreign policy decisions. The superpower rivalry and the
establishment of regional security alliances were the key
factors which guided U.S. thinking toward South Asia. The
other critical issue, nuclear nonproliferation has only
recently received emphasis in South Asia. U.S. attention was
first drawn to the issue when India exploded its first nuclear
device in 1974.
1 . Containment
For the first two decades after Great Britain granted
independence to its colonies in South Asia, U.S. policy in the
region was motivated primarily by the desire to contain commu-
nism, both the Soviet and Chinese versions. Washington's
policy makers saw South Asia as key terrain in the battle to
prevent the southward advance of communism. Policy makers
were "conditioned by the Dullesian quest for a vital link in
the alliance chain that the United States engineered on the
rim-land of the communist world." 113
Throughout this period the U.S. attempted to
strengthen its anti-communist alliances without jeopardizing
relations with India. The U.S. wanted India to be its primary
South Asian ally. Unfortunately, India, under the leadership
of Jawarharlal Nehru, remained firmly committed to its policy
of nonalignment . During his 1949 visit to the U.S., Nehru
"repeatedly stressed nonalignment and. . .placed Indo-U.S.
relations into proper perspective." 114 India's "proper
perspective" resulted in its rejection of U.S. -led alliances.
India remained committed to protecting its hard-won
independence. Its foreign policy rested on a foundation
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framed by the Panch shila or "Five Principles." 11S India
resisted becoming entangled in alliances which might have
served to limit its freedom of action.
Pakistan, on the other hand, desperately wanted to
become a member of the U.S. -led alliance. Faced with enemy
threats to its north and east and possessing insufficient
means to defend itself, Pakistan needed to find a security
patron and defender. In the post-WW II era only one country
was capable of providing that assistance. As the leader of
the non-communist world the U.S. had both the resources and
the ideological motivation to support Pakistan and defend it
from communist encroachment.
In October 1947, an emissary from Pakistan, Mr Laik
Ali, traveled to Washington with a memorandum soliciting U.S.
support for Pakistan. "The memorandum offered the interesting
justification that U.S. assistance to Pakistan would, in
effect, be a contribution to the defence of India against
Soviet encroachment." 116 Apparently this was a Pakistani
attempt to market itself as a South Asian buffer zone.
Initially, Washington was reluctant to provide direct
military assistance to Pakistan. Analysts for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, "did not think of Pakistan as of any
usefulness in promoting U.S. security interests in West
Asia." 117 American government officials were more interested
in promoting ties with Middle East countries and India than
with Pakistan.
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It was not until late 1949, when it became clear that
India's policy of non-alignment would prevent an Indo-U.S.
security arrangement, that U.S. analysts began to consider
Pakistan's potential as a security partner. In one State
Department document, a desk officer for Pakistan wrote,
We have no great assurance that India in the
future will ally itself with us and we have some
reason to believe that it might not. Pakistan, if
given reasonable encouragement, might prove the more
reliable friend. 118
The shift in focus by U.S. policy-makers, as a result
of growing frustration over their inability to reconcile with
India, and Pakistan's desperation to guarantee its own
security, led both countries to adopt a series of measures
which eventually put Pakistan in the position to be the
linchpin of U.S. containment strategy in Asia. The signing of
the Baghdad Pact in 1955 combined with Pakistan's membership
in SEATO to make it a firmly committed member of the U.S. -led
ant i-communist movement. 119
As the eastern flank of CENTO and the western flank of
SEATO, Pakistan was the anchor against possible Soviet
attempts to expand to the south into the Indian Ocean region.
Even after the termination of those two agreements, Pakistan's
commitment to limiting communist influence remained strong.
During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979
to 1989, Pakistan provided the conduit through which the
United States funnelled billions of dollars of military aid
and equipment to Afghan resistance efforts. It also provided
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sanctuary to millions of refugees from the war as well as a
base for international humanitarian relief. This prompted
both the Carter and Reagan Administrations to declare that
Pakistan was "a frontline state in the battle between the free
world and the communist empire." 120
Throughout the Cold War period military sales and
Foreign Military Assistance to Pakistan have made it one of
the top five recipients of U.S. military aid in terms of total
assistance received. 121
2. Nonproliferation
American interests in controlling the spread of
nuclear weapons and related technology on the Subcontinent
have replaced the containment of communism as the most
important as well as the most divisive issue. During
testimony before the U.S. Senate, CIA Director Robert Gates
stated that, "In South Asia the arms race between India and
Pakistan is a major concern .. .both countries have nuclear
weapons and ballistic missile programs. These programs are
particularly worrisome. . . . " 122
Since the mid-70s the U.S. has emphasized nuclear
nonproliferation as an important foreign policy goal. The
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) is the basic
legislation which governs U.S. policy and provides directives
relating to U.S. nuclear exports. 123 A number of amendments
42
to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 have been enacted which
link U.S. assistance with nonproliferation. (Appendix).
President Jimmy Carter used the provisions of these
laws to suspend aid to Pakistan in 1979 to emphasize his
administration's commitment to its nonproliferation goals. 124
This was largely a symbolic action, however, because Pakistan
was receiving an average of less than half a million dollars
per year in military assistance at the time. 125
Barely seven months later, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan caused the emphasis to shift and led, "two
successive administrations to seek a way to reconcile U.S.
nonproliferation concerns with a desire to bolster Pakistan's
security and independence." 126
C. U.S. POLICY EFFECTS
Increasing U.S. emphasis on the issue of nuclear weapons
programs and nonproliferation from the mid-1970s onward made
it more difficult to develop a consistent policy toward South
Asia. The United States' nonprolif eration interests both
complemented and conflicted with its interests in containing
communism. Concerns about nuclear issues, strategic/global
interests and regional interests created a paradox in U.S.
policy. 127
The interest in controlling the spread of nuclear weapons
technology in the region and U.S. desires to promote regional
stability and cooperation can be compatible since progress in
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one area may tend to support the goals of the other. However,
when strategic or global issues such as the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan became a priority, conflicting goals forced U.S.
policy makers to make situational choices.
During the 1980s U.S. leaders were aware that Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program was progressing rapidly. In his book,
The Undeclared Bomb, Leonard Spector provides an account of
the evidence which was presented to the Congress and available
to the Reagan Administration. 128 Leading members of Congress
favored sanctions based on this information. 129 However, the
Executive Branch chose to focus on the containment issue
instead. It acted in spite of mounting evidence in order to
arm the Pakistan military against the Soviet threat and
channel aid for the Afghan Mujahideen through Pakistan without
violating the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act




The decision to place a higher priority on global
strategic issues than on regional or proliferation issues sent
mixed signals to both Pakistani and Indian officials. The
peculiarities of the U.S. political system and the frequent
course changes in foreign policy provide a source of confusion
and frustration to South Asian officials who must interpret
the signals and develop policies of their own. In his essay,
"U.S. Policy in South Asia: The India Factor," Dr. Leo E. Rose
states that U.S. nonproliferation policies have "been
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counterproductive by enhancing the security apprehensions of
several countries interested in developing nuclear power." 131
1. Pakistan
In Pakistan, observers frequently conclude that what
they see as "inconsistent" U.S. policy decisions are a sign of
U.S. "ambivalence" or lack of commitment toward Pakistan. 132
In some instances these observations have proven to be a
useful means to protest against a U.S. policy with which
Pakistan simply disagrees.
Government officials and the press frequently cite
American decisions to suspend aid on four different occasions
as proof that the U.S. places very little value on Pakistan's
support and cooperation on Cold War issues. They contend that
because the U.S. has not supported Pakistan on issues such as
Kashmir and during its wars with India, that they are clearly
more a pawn than a partner. 133 In a leading Islamabad
newspaper one recent Opinion Page contributor characterized
U.S. actions as, "Deserting the most allied ally in 1965, 1971
or after the services as a front line state in the Afghan con-
flict." 134
The sense of betrayal which many Pakistanis feel has
also fostered a growing mistrust toward the United States. 135
Statements by U.S. officials and new policy decisions are
subjected to close scrutiny in Pakistan. The purpose of this
scrutiny is to discern the American "ulterior" motive. A
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recent case in point is the November 1991 mission by Reginald
Bartholomew, Under Secretary of State for International
Security. Mr. Bartholomew visited Islamabad and New Delhi to
express U.S. support for a series of confidence-building
steps, beginning with the upcoming exchange of nuclear
facilities lists.
Following Mr. Bartholomew's visit to Pakistan and
India, Dr. Shireen Mazari, Chairperson of the Department of
Defence and Strategic Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University,
published her critique of the situation. She warned that U.S.
intentions should be regarded with "suspicion" because of its
"hidden agenda". 136
Many in Pakistan view Washington's approach as
misguided and fundamentally unfair because it punishes
Pakistan, which has been a reliable ally. Pakistan's nuclear
weapons program is designed to counter India's superior
military capabilities. From the Pakistan perspective it is
only natural that they would want to develop defenses and an
ability to deter a traditional enemy. At the same time the
policy allows India, which has frequently opposed the U.S., to
continue its nuclear development unimpeded by sanctions. 137
The United States nonproliferation policy has not
succeeded because it has failed to reduce Pakistan's desire to
obtain nuclear weapons. In fact, U.S. policies may have
stimulated support for the nuclear option. 138 Defense of the
Pakistan homeland is considered to be of the highest priority.
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Most government leaders concede that Pakistan conventional
forces can never compete quantitatively with India. 139
Therefore many Pakistanis conclude that the only remaining op-
tions are to rely on the U.S. to come to its aid or to develop
a nuclear deterrent. 140 A general Pakistani lack of faith in
U.S. commitment, based on their view of U.S. actions in
previous Indo-Pak conflicts, makes the nuclear option appear
to be the only solution. Without a 'carrot' to offer as a
substitute, Washington's 'stick' policy has met with almost no
success in convincing Islamabad to abandon its nuclear weapons
program.
Throughout the last decade the Government of Pakistan
has made the most of the Afghan situation. In addition to
receiving billions of dollars in U.S. aid to strengthen its
conventional forces and support the efforts against the Soviet
Union, Pakistan has worked to develop its nuclear weapons
program. It has done so, safe in the knowledge that the U.S.
placed a higher priority on stopping the Soviets in
Afghanistan than on nonprolif eration concerns. American
assistance which strengthened Pakistan's conventional forces
also allowed Pakistan to concentrate a larger share of its
limited resources on its nuclear program.
2 . India
Washington's relations with New Delhi have been
somewhat erratic. "For more than thirty years, India has very
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much resented what it sees as an American search for fostering
a balance of power between Islamabad and New Delhi." 141 In
spite of the vast disparity in both size and potential of
India and Pakistan, U.S. policy has usually had the effect, if
not the intent, of equalizing the two countries. Washington
policy makers have frequently failed to give much weight to
opinions emanating from New Delhi.
Rather, they have tended to, "Dismiss India as an
irritant that can occasionally complicate decisions about
Asian issues but can be ignored or shunted aside at little
cost to the efficacy of U.S. policy decisions. 142 This
American attitude has deprived India of recognition as the
dominant power in South Asia and as a major force in world
affairs. India has consistently sought this recognition,
which it feels it deserves.
The issue of nonprolif eration, and U.S. policies in
general toward emerging nuclear states, has also had an
adverse impact on relations with India, even though India has
supported U.S. opposition to Pakistan's nuclear program. As
in the case with Pakistan, the policy of negative
reinforcement through denial of support has been ineffective.
There are two reasons for this failure.
First, the policy fails to address the root of the
proliferation problem. What motivates India to develop a
nuclear weapons program? India's biggest concern is not
Pakistan. India began its nuclear weapons program and has
retained its nuclear option primarily to counter what it per-
ceives to be the intimidating nuclear might of China. 143 If
the Indian fears of a Chinese threat could be removed, either
physically or through some reliable form of assurance, India
could defend itself with its conventional forces against any
other conceivable enemy.
American policy has tended to focus on the India-
Pakistan issue and either ignore or overlook the India-China
issues. The failure to identify and address all the key
aspects of the problem has helped to render U.S. efforts
ineffective
.
The other reason for the failure of U.S. policy is
that India is much less dependent on U.S. assistance than
Pakistan. India has a well-developed scientific and
technological base on which it has built its nuclear program.
It is the tenth ranked industrial nation in the world, ranks
third in the number of scientists and engineers and has 40
defense research laboratories. 144
India's solid domestic foundation has allowed it to
overcome most of the U.S. -imposed impediments to the
development of its nuclear program. One example illustrates
this point. In 1978 U.S. sale of fuel to operate India's
Tarapur power plant was suspended under provisions of the
Glenn Amendment. By 1982 the Tarapur reactors were operating
at full capacity through a combination of fuel from its own
unsafeguarded facilities and sales from France. 14 -'
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India has also been critical of American policy during
the Afghan crisis. Indians tend to view the U.S. actions
during this period as destabilizing to the region because it
assisted the build-up of conventional forces in Pakistan and
at the same time ignored the nuclear developments. This
presents a dual threat to India's security. 146
Some Indian critics have compared U.S. policy in the
80s with the military assistance program it carried out in the
60s. Under terms included in the CENTO and SEATO agreements,
aid to Pakistan was intended for use only against communist
threats. However, Pakistan used a large portion of the assis-
tance to strengthen itself along its Indian border and subse-
quently became involved in two wars with its eastern neigh-
bor. 147
D. CONCLUSION
American policy in South Asia has been the product of two
strong, but conflicting interests. As a result,
nonproliferation interests have been forced to take a
secondary position to the containment imperative. Containment
strategy contributed to the demise of the Soviet Union and the
end of the Cold War. Unfortunately, nonproliferation efforts
have been less successful.
The United States has not succeeded in preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia. It has only
slowed the process down a bit. The end of the Cold War
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provides an opportunity to rearrange the policy priorities of
the last four decades and take a new look at the current
situation
.
Both India and Pakistan have shown signs that they may
also be prepared to give the issue some fresh thought. The
U.S. should take the opportunity to make the most of the
changing international situation. A restructured nuclear
nonproliferation strategy, unencumbered by Cold War
restraints, has a real chance to succeed in South Asia.
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IV. U.S. POLICY - NEW OPPORTUNITIES AND NEW OPTIONS
A. U.S. POLICY - THE FUTURE
With the end of the Cold War the time has come for
Washington to reassess its nuclear policy in South Asia. This
reassessment must map the strategy for the future based on a
number of factors, such as: the effects of the end of the
Cold War and reduced superpower competition in the region;
potential restraints on U.S. resources; and, the need for
U. S . -Pakistani-Indian cooperation on issues of mutual concern
and interest
.
This chapter discusses the future of U.S. policy and
presents one possible approach to be taken. The three-stage
approach includes: defining appropriate goals, establishing
policy guidelines, and developing a strategy to implement
those policies.
1. Goals
The first and most important factor is the objective:
"What does the U.S. hope to accomplish through its nuclear
policy in South Asia?" A clear answer to this question is
essential for an effective policy. The current answer to this
question can be found in The National Security Strategy of the
United States, which lists two of its objectives as, 1)
Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with
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allies and friendly nations, and 2) A stable and secure world,
where political and economic freedom, human rights and
democratic institutions flourish. 148
General goals which support these objectives are:
1. Establish a more balanced partnership with our allies and
a greater sharing of global leadership and responsibilities.
2. Maintain stable regional military balances to deter those
powers that might seek regional dominance.
3. Promote diplomatic resolutions to regional disputes. 149
In South Asia this translates more specifically into
supporting the development of Indian and Pakistani
conventional military forces capable of defending the
geographic boundaries and national interests of their
respective countries. These forces must be able to deter
aggression without being inherently threatening to each other.
It also means encouraging a solution to the Kashmir
issue and the various other border disputes and ethnic
problems which exist. These problems serve as destabilizing
factors in the Indo-Pakistani relationship and provide the
potential to escalate into more dangerous situations.
Properly developed, the U.S. policy on nuclear
proliferation can play an important role in contributing to
the success of these goals.
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2. Policies
After the goals have been clearly identified, the next
step is to formulate specific guidelines and establish
policies which will help achieve those goals. This is not a
simple task, given the complexity of the nuclear issue in
South Asia. However, there are a number of basic problems on
which to focus.
The long-term goal of the United States has been and
should continue to be to prevent and discourage the
establishment of nuclear weapons regimes in South Asia. This
is by definition a nonproliferation policy. However, the
current South Asian nuclear situation described in earlier
chapters indicates that U.S. policy must also have an arms
control component to help prevent the Indian- and Pakistani
nuclear weapons programs from advancing further in the interim
period.
As long as both India and Pakistan perceive a need to
keep the nuclear option available as a threat deterrent there
is a risk. A single act or series of events could cause one
side or the other to conclude that its best option for self-
defense is the assembly or use of a nuclear weapon. Assembly
or deployment of a nuclear weapon by one side would invoke a
response by the other. This scenario would probably
degenerate into a nuclear arms race and bring the region one
step closer to a nuclear war. The best way to reduce this
risk is to reduce the threat.
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The U.S. -USSR nuclear arms race provides a good
illustration of this point. As long as there was the
perception that the countries posed a threat to each other it
proved nearly impossible to achieve significant reductions in
nuclear weapons in spite of SALT, START and the NPT. Not
until the Soviet Union showed signs of its impending collapse
in 1991, reducing the threat to the U.S., did either side
become willing to make significant concessions in its nuclear
ISO
While there are many differences between the
superpower nuclear situation and the Indo-Pakistani
confrontation, the perception of the threat contains enough
parallels to make the analysis valid. 151 Unless both
Pakistan and India are assured that the threat of attack is
greatly decreased their desire to retain the nuclear weapons
option will remain.
As stated in the National Security Strategy, one of
the fundamental challenges associated with the control of
nuclear weapons is that, "A successful non-proliferation
strategy must address the underlying security concerns that
drive the quest to obtain advanced weapons..." 1 - 2 Unfortu-
nately, U.S. policies to date have failed to address those
concerns in South Asia. Since 1976, three successive
administrations have attempted to accomplish their nonpro-
liferation goals through the use of high pressure tactics and
punitive measures. These measures have been designed to
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coerce the threshold nuclear weapon states into abandoning
their programs. Unless policy makers also begin to address
South Asian security concerns U.S. nonproliferation goals will
continue to be unattainable.
3 . Implementation
After developing a clear, coherent policy U.S.
officials must consider one final factor. They must be able
to implement specific actions to carry out the policy and
achieve the goals. These actions must address the security
concerns in India and Pakistan and thereby reduce their
motivation to continue to develop nuclear weapons. These
actions can be divided into three categories:
1
.
Host a series of discussions which address the
security issues within the South Asian region.
2 Encourage India and Pakistan to agree to a series of
CBMs designed to improve cooperation reduce the tensions
between them.
3. Send a clear signal to both sides that the U.S.
intends to pursue its nonproliferation objective.
4. Discussions
Attempts should be made to initiate a series of
discussions on regional and international levels. These talks
would allow the participating countries to air their security
concerns, discuss the issues and provide a forum for the
discussion of possible resolutions. These talks would open up
channels of communications in a sort of nuclear glasnost that
would permit regular discussions between government officials
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at various levels, to include heads of state. 153 The number
of variations in the types of talks to be held and the
composition of participants is virtually unlimited. A number
of examples come to mind which illustrate the concept
.
In June 1991, The Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz
Sharif, publicly proposed a meeting between five countries;
United States, Soviet Union, Peoples' Republic of China (PRC)
,
India and Pakistan, to discuss creation of a nuclear weapons-
free zone in South Asia. 154 While this may be too specific
a topic for an initial discussion, it is not unreasonable to
think that government officials from the five nations (with
Russia replacing the USSR) could meet to discuss general
topics concerning nuclear issues.
One important aspect which must be. addressed is
China's role in the South Asian nuclear picture. Since India
cites China as a security threat, any discussion or long term
solution will also have to deal with the China factor.
China's promise to sign the NPT and abide by the Nuclear
Suppliers agreements provides hope that this obstacle can be
overcome. The U.S. should also encourage ongoing bilateral
efforts such as attempts by India and China to discuss and
resolve issues of mutual concern.
This type of discussion and communication should not
be limited to government leaders and policy makers.
Conferences which bring together members of the scientific,
academic and military communities will also promote better
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understanding and cooperation. This could also include ship
visits, joint military exercises, and personnel exchange
programs
.
Continuing efforts to engage in constructive dialogues
can help solve the problems of national security by reducing
tensions. They can also provide a pressure release valve
during periods of increased tensions and provide a non-
military avenue for conflict resolution. 155
5. Tension Reduction
Indo-Pakistani relations are characterized by
distrust, fear and mutual animosity. Because they are the two
most powerful countries in the region it follows that
relations between the two will set the tone for the entire
region. As Paul Kreisberg states, "A reduction of Indo-
Pakistani tensions is essential to assure regional
stability. 156
If the United States expects to realize its goal of
regional stability it will have to take steps to reduce the
friction between the South Asian powers. India and Pakistan
have from time to time made tentative gestures indicating that
both countries understand the necessity for improved
relations. Unfortunately, most of these efforts have been
short-lived and inconsequential. 157
Washington policy makers should make a concerted
effort to encourage a series of bilateral confidence building
measures between India and Pakistan. Because the differences
between them are so great, a comprehensive resolution in the
near future is probably not realistic. However, even
relatively small gains now will serve as the foundation for
future relations.
The 1988 Zia-Gandhi agreement sets a precedent and
provides a possible starting point for new CBM proposals and
discussions. Some of the potential issues which could be
considered are:
1. "No first assembly or first deployment" agreement. This
would assure that neither side would be the first to
completely assemble a nuclear weapon or take up a
threatening deployment posture.
2. "No attack on urban centers" agreement.
3. Mutual inspection of nuclear facilities. .
4. Exchanges of experts and technical personnel.
5. Agreement to ban the development, production and use of
chemical and biological weapons.
6. Declarations opposing use of nuclear weapons.
This is by no means a comprehensive list of CBMs. 158
Each of these may also be subject to objections on various
grounds that they are ineffective or cannot be verified.
However, the objective is to make small gains initially.
The United States can best facilitate this process by
offering its services as a moderator and honest broker during
bilateral negotiations or as an intermediary in a shuttle
diplomacy setting. This would put the U.S. in a position to
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influence or advise both parties but would put the decision-
making responsibility on the affected parties.
The Kashmir impasse could provide an opportunity for
this type of U.S. intervention. The situation in Kashmir is
both a reason for and an outcome of historical Indo-Pakistan
tensions. 159 The problem has gone unsolved since 1948 and
has become more complex. It seems that neither side is
capable of some type of agreement on a solution without
outside assistance. 160 The U.S. could play the role of a
non-partisan moderator in Indo-Pak negotiations.
This approach would have the corollary benefit of
removing any remaining Cold War associations from U.S.
involvement in South Asia. The U.S. would be able to
demonstrate that it supports regional stability and that it
does not view its South Asian foreign policy as a zero-sum
game. It would also be able to reinforce that improved
bilateral relations with one country do not have to correlate
to declining relations with the other.
6. Signal Intentions
The United States has not always clearly demonstrated
that it is serious about nonproliferation. There are two
actions that can be taken to correct this misperception : 1)
Send a clear signal to both India and Pakistan that
clandestine nuclear programs are not acceptable, and, 2) Lead
by example in the arms control arena.
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a. Send a Signal
When President Bush refused to certify Pakistan
under the Pressler Amendment in October 1990, he sent part of
the message. Throughout the 1980s Pakistan had advanced its
nuclear weapons program until it violated the clearly stated
limits for U.S. assistance. By suspending military
assistance, the president demonstrated U.S. commitment to
nonproliferation and put the onus on Pakistan to decide what
to do.
Since that time Pakistan claims to have met two of
the three conditions needed for the resumption of aid. It has
halted production of fissile material and stopped construction
of non-nuclear components. 161
The United States must now send the same badly
needed signal to India. It can do this by applying the same
conditions to India that exist for Pakistan. At the present
time, India holds the upper hand over Pakistan because it is
possesses military superiority. However, the Indian military
is also interested in closer ties with the U.S. military and
defense industries. 162 Linking military cooperation with
nuclear proliferation issues will emphasize the U.S. position
and encourage India to take a greater interest.
The Indian government and particularly its
military, is interested in increased transfer of advanced
technology and support for industrial modernization. In
addition to withholding assistance because of noncompliance,
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the U.S. government should also make it clear that progress on
arms control and nonproliferation issues would make some
assistance in these areas more readily available.
The Bush Administration opposes extension of the
Pressler Amendment to include India on the grounds that it
limits Executive Branch foreign policy options. However, the
legislation currently in effect has a number of provisions
which provide the president with options. It is more
important to have the force of U.S. law behind the signal to
be sent
.
b. Lead by Example
The Bush Administration has already taken some
actions which move the U.S. in this direction. The decisions
to remove tactical nuclear weapons from the' theaters, and
reductions below levels mandated by START demonstrate that the
United States is committed to arms control and the NPT.
Another example of strong U.S. commitment is the current
Congressional debates concerning the future of U.S. nuclear
force structure. 163
These actions contribute to dispelling the Indian
and Pakistani arguments that the U.S. is hypocritical in its
position because it only favors arms control and non-
proliferation regimes for other countries. 164 Continued U.S.
efforts in this regard will reassure both India and Pakistan
and make it more difficult for them to defend their arguments.
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B. CONCLUSION
Successful U.S. nuclear policy in South Asia depends on
two elements. It must first be based on a thorough analysis
of the interests of all the concerned parties. Second, it
must be executed in a consistent manner, making every effort
to satisfy all those interests as much as possible.
In the current environment this requires a policy which
combines elements of both arms control and nonproliferation
regimes. Arms control policies address the realities of the
current nuclear weapons situations in both India and Pakistan.
Long-term efforts to support nonproliferation are geared
toward making South Asia and the world a safer place to live.
But to be effective, this tandem approach must be
synchronized to make both parts work in concert. Past U.S.
experience in South Asia demonstrates that only a consistent
approach has any chance for success.
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V. CONCLUSION
The U.S. State Department is currently making plans to
activate a new South Asia Bureau which Congress created in
1991. 165 This indicates that U.S. leaders recognize not only
that the Indian Subcontinent is a distinct region of the
world, but also that it deserves a level of attention at least
on par with others. The special set of circumstances that
exist in the region especially with regard to the Indian and
Pakistani nuclear weapons programs make it an area of great
concern in U.S. foreign policy issues.
The transformation of the international political
environment calls for a fundamental reassessment of
Washington's South Asia nuclear policy. This thesis has
attempted to highlight several key points.
A. KEY ACTORS
The first point is that the United States is not the most
important player in the Indo-Pakistani nuclear issue. If any
long-term success is to be achieved either in arms control or
nonprolif eration, both India and Pakistan must be willing
participants. No third-party participant will be able to
cajole, force or buy the support of either India or Pakistan
for any measures that fail to serve their own interests.
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The United States can best serve as a supporting player
and fill a role as honest-broker, mediator, or non-partisan
advisor. It should be prepared to perform whatever functions
it can to foster peaceful resolutions to conflicts and support




At the same time the U.S. should not compromise its own
position and national interests with regard to nuclear
nonprolif eration. It should continue to set the example by
pursuing meaningful arms control measures and championing
international nonproliferation regimes.
By demonstrating its commitment to nonprolif eration and
remaining actively involved in South Asia, the United States
can influence the outcome to protect its own interests.
C. GLOBAL BENEFITS
American efforts to produce meaningful nonproliferation
results in South Asia have the potential to produce corollary
benefits on an international scale. The United States has a
great deal of experience negotiating arms control agreements
on a bilateral basis. However, there is potentially a great
deal to be learned about negotiating with multiple parties.
The experience gained by participating in the process in
South Asia may be valuable if it is applied to other regions
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of the world. Negotiations in the Central Asian Republics of
the C.I.S. and in the Middle East involve a larger number of
participants. Lessons learned in dealing with a limited
number of participants may make it easier or less time
consuming to deal with a larger group.
D. NEW APPROACHES
Finally, it is important to consider that the policies and
methods that won the Cold War may not be appropriate to deal
with the realities of a new global environment. New
situations demand new and creative ideas. Most of the
recommendations presented here have been extracted as bits and
pieces from a wide variety of sources, many of which supported
opposite points of view.
In the context of South Asia, arms control and
nonproliferation measures need not operate in mutually
exclusive regimes. Many of the CBMs discussed previously fall
into the category of arms control or proliferation management
tools. However, in South Asia these same tools may be able to
create interim solutions that eventually lead to
nonproliferation goals.
The key is not to reject any solution presented in good
faith without examining it thoroughly. If possible the
valuable parts should be kept and combined with the
contributions of others.
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American and South Asian leaders should seek to find new
ways to cooperate on issues where national interests converge.
The creation of stable security environments is one of those
issues. The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons will help insure that goal.
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APPENDIX
Key Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is the basic law which
establishes guidelines for military, economic and humanitarian
assistance to other nations. Since India's nuclear test in
1974 a number of provisions have been added that link foreign
assistance to nuclear nonprolif eration . The most important
amendments affecting U.S. aid to South Asia are:
1. The Symington Amendment (Section 669), 1976. This
amendment prohibits U.S. aid to any Non-Nuclear Weapon State
(NNWS) which attempts to import uranium or acquire uranium
enrichment technology without submitting to International
Atomic Energy safeguards. The amendment contains a
provision which allows the President to waive restrictions
if it seriously affects the national interest.
2. The Glenn Amendment (Section 670), 1977. This amendment
prohibits U.S. aid to any country that attempts to acquire
the technology to reprocess plutonium from spent reactor
fuel. It further prohibits aid to any NNWS that attempts to
receive or transfer a nuclear explosive device. The
President cannot waive the provisions of this amendment
without an act of Congress.
3. The Pressler Amendment (Section 670E) , 1985. This
amendment applies specifically to Pakistan. It requires the
President to certify annually that Pakistan does not possess
a nuclear device in order for Pakistan to receive aid.
Failure to certify results in suspension of all aid.
4. The Solar z Amendment [Section 670 (a) (1) (B) ] , 1985. This
amendment prohibits aid to any country which attempts to
illegally export nuclear technology or materials from the
U.S. This was enacted as a result of a 1984 attempt to
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smuggle high speed switches, called krytons, from Houston to
Pakistan. The switches are used as part of the detonating
device in nuclear weapons. The President also has the
authority to waive this provision if he deems it to be in
the interest of national security to do so.
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